

Computing the Shapley value to share ressources in cooperative games

François Lamothe and Sandra U. Ngueveu

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- Focus
 - Study a more environmentally/socially friendly online retail



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


- Focus
 - Study a more environmentally/socially friendly online retail
- Industrial partner : One Stock
- Main participants
 - Sandra U. Ngueveu (Holder)
 - Francois Lamothe (Post-doc)
 - Théo Le Brun (PhD Student)
- Open to new collaborators

Cost sharing indicator

Package delivery system

- Service to a set of customers \rightarrow cost
- Economies of scale




Vehicle routing problem

Cost sharing indicator

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
Question :

How to divide the total cost amongst the users ?

Cost sharing indicator

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


Dividing equally among the customers?

Cost sharing indicator

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Dividing dividing proportionally to the distance to the depot ?

Cooperative games and Shapley value : definition

Cooperative game

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- Value function $v : S \subset N \rightarrow v(S)$
 - $v(S)$: Cost of servicing the players in S

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 - Linearity : works well with sum of games

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


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


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


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Cooperative game

- A set of player N : customers
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Shapley value :



- Average over all possible orders :
 - $\phi(v, i) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi(N)} \Delta(S_i^\pi, i)$
- NP-Hard to compute \rightarrow approximation

Approximation with sampling

Shapley value : $\phi(v, i) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi(N)} \Delta(S_i^\pi, i)$

Shapley value as an expectation : $\phi(v, i) = \mathbb{E}_\pi[\Delta(S_i^\pi, i)]$

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
Classical approximation method :

- Expectation \rightarrow average over samples
- Sampling a set of permutations Π
- $\phi(v, i) \approx \frac{1}{|\Pi|} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi} \Delta(S_i^\pi, i)$

Stratified sampling


Stratified sampling

Example : estimating mean human size




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
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
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
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
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- Example : mean size = (mean man size + mean woman size) / 2

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
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Law of total expectations : $\mathbb{E}[\hat{\theta}] = P(A) \mathbb{E}[\hat{\theta}|A] + P(\bar{A}) \mathbb{E}[\hat{\theta}|\bar{A}]$

Stratified estimator : $\frac{P(A)}{|\Theta_A|} \sum_{\theta \in \Theta_A} \theta + \frac{P(\bar{A})}{|\Theta_{\bar{A}}|} \sum_{\theta \in \Theta_{\bar{A}}} \theta$

Stratification events for the Shapley value

Shapley value : $\phi(v, i) = \frac{1}{n!} \sum_{\pi \in \Pi(N)} \Delta(S_i^\pi, i)$

Groups :

- What is the position of player i in permutation π ? $\rightarrow |N|$ groups
- Is player j before or after player i ? $\rightarrow 2$ groups

How to use and combine all this groups/stratifications?

Flexible stratification with optimization

Problem : we can't stratify according to 2 events independently.

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- Estimate $\mathbb{E}[\theta|A \cap B]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\theta|A \cap \bar{B}]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\theta|\bar{A} \cap B]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\theta|\bar{A} \cap \bar{B}]$
→ 2^n estimates

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- Estimate $\mathbb{E}[\theta|A]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\theta|\bar{A}]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\theta|B]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\theta|\bar{B}]$
→ How to combine them ?

Flexible stratification with optimization

New paradigm :

- We are estimating the expectation $\mathbb{E}[\theta]$ with a weighted average of sample
- Each sample σ has a weight w_σ
- If we know the proba $P(A)$ of event A : we want $\sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_A} w_\sigma = P(A)$

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
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Modeling with a QP :

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{w_\sigma} \quad & \sum_A (W(A) - P(A))^2 + \epsilon \sum_{\sigma} (w_\sigma)^2 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{\sigma} w_\sigma = 1 \end{aligned}$$


Shapley value 🤖 vs core 😊

Example : all length = 1 ; vehicule capacity = 2



Shapley value 🤖 vs core 🐱


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- Best value = 5 ; Shapley value = $5/3$

Shapley value 🤖 vs core 🐱


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- Best value = 5 ; Shapley value = $5/3$
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- Core can be non-empty but not contain the Shapley value

Thank you for your attention

Package

https://github.com/TwistedNerves/shapley_approximation

Paper :

Approximating the Shapley value with sampling : survey and new stratification techniques, Francois Lamothe, Sandra U. Ngueveu